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Abstract
We test the effects of informal rewards in online peer production. Using a randomized, experimental design, we assigned
editing awards or ‘‘barnstars’’ to a subset of the 1% most productive Wikipedia contributors. Comparison with the control
group shows that receiving a barnstar increases productivity by 60% and makes contributors six times more likely to receive
additional barnstars from other community members, revealing that informal rewards significantly impact individual effort.
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Introduction
Internet-enabled peer production makes it possible for organi-
zations to pool work from geographically-dispersed volunteers to
create non-trivial goods and services [1,2]. One striking example is
the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, where production of content
follows a long-tailed distribution carried by a core of extremely
active individuals [3], while consumption is dispersed across a vast
population of free-riders [4,5]. This raises the question of what
accounts for time-intensive contributions to large-scale peer
production efforts by socially-unembedded and oftentimes anon-
ymous individuals in the absence of salary or contract [6].
In peer production, it is believed that informal rewards from
fellow contributors substitute for material incentives to dedicate
time and resources. Wikipedia contributors can award their peers
a barnstar – an editing award – by posting it on a user’s page for
public display. Receiving a barnstar indicates that one’s efforts are
recognized as valuable and is thought to act as a sign of prestige
within the community [7]. A survey of Wikipedia contributors by
the Wikimedia Foundation concluded that ‘‘positive interactions
like receiving compliments and barnstars from fellow editors …
made them more likely to edit Wikipedia’’ [8]. This idea is
consistent with social scientific theories suggesting that positive
incentives such as rewards, social recognition, peer esteem, and
accrual of status can serve as motivations for contributing to public
goods more generally [9–13].
Existing approaches to evaluating the effects of informal
rewards in peer production have been inconclusive. First, this is
because contributors’ self-reports on how rewards affect them are
of questionable reliability due to evaluation or perceptual biases.
Second, in longitudinal records of contributor behavior, contri-
bution and reward histories co-evolve making it difficult to
disentangle cause from effect. To overcome these challenges, we
conducted a controlled experiment under naturalistic conditions in
which informal rewards were randomly allocated to a real-world
population of Wikipedia contributors.
Methods
This study’s research protocol was approved by the Committees
on Research Involving Human Subjects (IRB) at the State
University of New York at Stony Brook (CORIHS #2011-
1394). Because the experiment presented only minimal risks to
subjects, the IRB committee determined that obtaining prior
informed consent from participants was not required. Confiden-
tiality of personally-identifiable information has been maintained
in strict accordance with Human Subjects Committee require-
ments for privacy safeguards.
We designed our experiment to test the hypothesis that informal
rewards have a reinforcing effect on volunteer work effort. We
performed our experiment on a random sample of 200 active
contributors from among the 1% most productive editors who had
never been awarded a barnstar from another user. To construct
our sampling frame, we obtained a list of active Wikipedia
contributors – defined as any user who performed at least 1 edit
(modification to the English Wikipedia project) in the 30-day
window prior to the start of the experiment. We ranked this
population of 144,120 contributors by their total number of edits,
after which we screened into our sampling frame the top 1% of
users and discarded the remaining. Next, we eliminated any high-
volume contributors who had previously received a barnstar or
had elevated administrative privileges in the community. We then
took a uniformly random sample of 200 users and through random
assignment either awarded a barnstar (100 cases) or withheld the
award in the control group (100 cases). Finally, we observed all
200 subjects’ actions for 90 days.
After the observation period ended, we compared contributors’
productivity (article modifications) and peer recognition (addition-
al barnstars received from other users) across conditions. To
account for between-subject differences in pre-treatment produc-
tivity, we calculated cumulative productivity on any day as the
running total number of article modifications divided by the
number of article modifications in the 30-day pre-treatment
period. To test the null hypothesis that post-treatment productivity
would be equal across conditions, we employed a measure of
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Whitney U test) that are robust to outliers and distributional skew.
To test for an experimental effect in subsequent peer recognition,
we performed a Pearson chi-square test (x
2).
Results and Discussion
In both groups, median productivity was lower after the
treatment, which can be attributed to regression toward the mean
– resulting from our sampling the 1% most productive users – as
well as to general turnover in the contributor population.
However, users who received a barnstar exhibited greater
sustained productivity and were less likely to discontinue
contributing. Of 19 users who made zero edits in the post-
experiment observation period, only five received the experimen-
tal treatment (x
2=4. 711, df=1, p=0.030).
We also find significant between-group differences in produc-
tivity: receiving a barnstar increased median productivity by 60%
compared to the control group (Mann-Whitney U-test: z=3.222;
p=0.001), shown in Figure 1. Other tests (median test, Student’s
T test) also yield significant differences between conditions
(p,0.01). The magnitude of this difference remained approxi-
mately constant over the course of the 90-day observation period,
suggesting that the barnstars we awarded had a sustained effect on
productivity. In addition to exhibiting greater productivity,
subjects in the experimental condition were significantly more
likely to receive additional rewards from other contributors.
Twelve experimental subjects were subsequently awarded one or
more barnstars from other contributors, compared to two subjects
in the control group (x
2=7.681, df=1, p=0.006). These twelve
individuals exhibited no greater productivity prior to receiving the
additional barnstars when compared to others in the experimental
condition (Mann-Whitney U-test: z=.743; p=0.458). For this
test, productivity was calculated as the total number of edits up to
day 8, when the first additional barnstar was awarded. The result
of the test remains unchanged when productivity is calculated up
to day 82, when the last additional barnstar was awarded (Mann-
Whitney U-test: z=.796; p=0.426). This suggests that cumulative
advantage [14,15] in the allocation of informal rewards operates
through a mechanism of enhanced social prestige in the
community and not increased merit.
The findings demonstrate that even though informal rewards
are free to give and carry no immediate material benefits, they
have a substantial positive effect on the productivity of Wikipedia
contributors. Our findings indicate that this beneficial effect can
become self-reinforcing as reward-receiving accumulates for
recipients. Together, these results suggest that the facilitating role
of informal rewards in peer production systems derives from their
ability to stimulate individual effort as well as contribute to an
accrual of social recognition. While previous scholars suggest that
the intensity of informal rewards in peer production is low [6], the
present research quantifies their magnitude and indicates that
informal rewards may play a key role in sustaining volunteer effort.
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